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Abstract
This paper develops a theory of the gender wage gap. In a general equilib-
rium model, spouses devide their labor between a formal sector and a home
sector. Due to indivisibility e¤ects, productivity of labor in the formal sector
is negatively related to labor used in the home; at the same time labor inputs
are complementary in home production. We show that initial beliefs about
the gender wage gap are self-fullling, and a central result is multiplicity of
equilibria. Spouses allocate their labor equally, if they expect to earn the
same wage rates, which ex post reinforces equal wage rates; whereas they
allocate their labor di¤erently, if they expect to earn di¤erent wage rates.
The latter situation manifests itself in a gender wage gap. By use of numer-
ical examples, we show that welfare is highest when spouses allocate labor
equally. We relate this nding to policy recommendations.
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1 Introduction
The gender wage gap has been explained by an inherent source of di¤erence between
men and women, which causes women to earn lower wages. For example, Elul et al.
(2002) suggest that gender-di¤erences in wages can be attributed to demographic
reasons. Men marry younger women, and men therefore, before getting married,
have the opportunity to settle where they receive maximal compensation. Women,
on the other hand, marry at younger age, and are accordingly more likely to settle
where their compensation is not at maximum. Siow (1998) attribute di¤erences in
earnings to a biological factor: di¤erences in fecundity. Women are only able to
have children in a limited period of their lives, whereas men are not subject to this
restriction. Men therefore need extra income to have children when old, and thus
have an incentive to work more than women. This leads to higher human capital
accumulation and, consequently, higher male wage rates relative to female wage
rates.
The starting point for our analysis of the gender wage gap, on the contrary, is
an economy in which, male and female individuals, with one of each represented
in a household, are ex ante generically identical except for gender. Within this
symmetric framework, we explain the possibility that the gender wage gap is last-
ing rather than disappearing. Our analysis demonstrates that gender equality in
terms of equal education and equal opportunity are necessary, but not su¢ cient,
conditions to eliminate the gender wage gap. Beliefs about the gender wage ratio
play a crucial role in this result in that they are self-fullling. As such beliefs, even
in modern society, are likely to be shaped by historical facts, todays notion of rel-
ative wages is arguably biased towards a gender wage gap. Due to the self-fullling
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nature of such a notion, our model suggests that a gender wage gap will persist
unless actions are taken to change societys beliefs.
We develop a general equilibrium model in which we link two sectors; a home
sector and a formal sector. Our model is based on two main assumptions: indivis-
ibility e¤ects of labor in the formal sector, the workplace; and complementarity of
husbands and wifes labor input in home production.
Home production takes place within households. Households are described by
a standard unitary household model and labor is allocated as to achieve intra-
household e¢ ciency. This means that labor of each spouse is allocated so the
marginal value product of labor in home production equals the wage rate. If spouses
expect to earn di¤erent wage rates, they allocate their labor di¤erently. On the
other hand, if spouses expect to earn the same wage rate, they allocate their labor
identically. Complementary in home production means that one household member
cannot produce without labor input from her spouse. This assumption is certainly
justiable for household activities which concern reproduction. More generally, one
can argue that without mutual a¤ection and attention, there will be no household
production by either family member.
The indivisibility e¤ects of labor in the workplace imply that one employee work-
ing 2T hours produces more than two employees each working T hours. Arguments
in favor of this relationship include sunk costs such as start-up costs. Moreover, if
more workers are assigned on the same project, they may have to exchange infor-
mation and update one another, which is likely to be costly in terms of decreasing
productivity. The assumption also reects protability of availability. The more
time an employee spends at the job, the more likely the employee is able to act
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immediately in case of emergencies and urgent requests. Arguments can further-
more be made in favor of learning by doing e¤ects in the workplace; the more time
a worker spends producing, the more productive the worker becomes.1 A conse-
quence of indivisibility of labor in employment is that the less labor a worker puts
into home production, the more productive the worker is in employment.
Firms are non-discriminating,2 competitive, and hire workers taking as given
the supply of labor (in terms of hours)3 of each worker. They hire workers until
the marginal productivity of a worker equals her marginal costs (her salary). Firms
are therefore willing to hire both low and high productivity workers, if the workers
salaries vary accordingly. In equilibrium, a worker who works long hours earns a
high wage, and a worker who works short hours earns a low wage.
A key result of our model is the existence of multiple equilibria. In particular,
there exist: both an equilibrium in which spouses di¤er in their labor allocation,
and earn di¤erent wages, and an equilibrium in which all workers have identical
labor allocations, and earn the same wage. In this way, our model explains gender-
di¤erences in earnings by gender-di¤erences in labor allocation. In turn, gender-
1It can be argued that the gap in hourly wages between part-time and full-time jobs to some
extent reects di¤erences in e¤ectiveness between short and long hours. Such a gap has been
reported repeatedly, e.g., by the U.S. Department of Labor (2005). In 2004, a full-time worker
in the US earned about $19 per hour, whereas part-time workers earned only $10. Yet a portion
of the di¤erence may be accounted for by occupational di¤erences. Hirsch (2000) nds that the
part-time wage gap diminishes considerably by controlling for age, gender, skill level, and other
variables. Also Bonke et al. (2005) discuss how increasing hours in household production are
correlated with wages. They nd that household work has a negative e¤ect on female wages. The
same is not completely true for men, however; low-end male wages are positively correlated with
household work.
2Meyersson Milgrom et al. (2001) nd that, within Sweden, men and women doing the same
work for the employer are paid the same salary. In academic labor markets, however, evidence of
discrimination has consistently appeared (Blackaby et al. 2005).
3This assumption at rst may seem to contradict the conventional assumption that labor
demand is decreasing in wages. This would be true if we did not distinguish between the number
of workers and number of hours worked. Indeed, we postulate that workers and hours are not
perfectly substitutable (see, e.g., Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) for a discussion).
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di¤erences in labor allocation occur if the initial beliefs about wages are stereotype.4
If indeed beliefs are stereotype, the labor market dictates a wage rate for women
and a wage rate for men.5
Another question we address is whether the gender wage gap equilibrium is
Pareto e¢ cient. By use of numerical examples, it turns out that a gender wage gap
situation is inferior, as it brings less welfare to society than the situation in which
spouseslabor allocation and wage rates are the same. Household members share
identical factor shares in household production. Accordingly, in the equilibrium
in which labor allocation is identical across spouses, total labor input in home
production may be less than in the unequal case, and yet produce more household
service. This implies welfare gains, since the extra freed labor is used in the rm.
In a closely related, but independent paper, Albanesi and Olivetti (2006) also
argues that the gender wage gap may be explained as a result of the interaction
between a family, who allocates labor between the home and the rm, and the rm
which hires labor. Unlike our paper, however, which emphasizes interaction between
household production and e¤ectiveness of labor use in the workplace, Albanesi and
Olivetti focus on labor market attachment; household members choose both e¤ort
and labor market hours. They examine two situations: the situation with an initial
di¤erence in productivities of men and women, and the situation without. In the
latter, which resembles the assumptions in our model, the authors nd two types
of equilibria which they refer to as gendered and ungendered. In contrast to our
analysis, their focus is not on complementarity in home production and indivisibility
4By stereotype, we mean traditional patterns of sex roles.
5We stress that this mechanism is conceptually di¤erent from discrimination in that in our
model the wage rate for men and women coincides when initial beliefs are unisex.
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e¤ects of labor in the workplace, but like our analysis, the self-fullling nature of
initial beliefs determines the outcome.
Our model is also related to the framework outlined in Beckers seminal work on
sexual division of labor published in 1985. Becker argues that even if husband and
wife are intrinsically identical, they gain from a division of labor between employ-
ment and household work; one specializes in employment and the other specializes
at home. Such a division raises the productivity of both persons. Beckers result
is driven partly by Beckers assumption about the production function in home
production; the household service is produced according to a production function
where inputs of each family member are perfect substitutes in production. As we
consider a household production function in which labor from both household mem-
bers is complementary in production, our results are di¤erent in that, despite the
specialization gains in the workplace which arises from the indivisibility assumption,
household members do not specialize completely in di¤erent sectors.
Chichilnisky and Eisenberger (2005) study production functions, learning curves,
and the division of labor within families. Using a logistic learning curve which
changes from convexity to concavity through an inection point, they nd that
for the concave part, which represents highly skilled labor, equal division of tasks
is e¢ cient whereas for unskilled labor e¢ ciency involves specialization. The lat-
ter result replicates the Becker (1985) outcome. Their model implies that within
advanced economies, where labor is highly skilled, di¤erences in labor allocation
between men and women can be ascribed to market failures. Chichilnisky (2005),
who also uses a logistic learning curve, argues that missing contracts between the
home and the workplace, and missing property rights to household services, lead
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to an outcome with an unequal division of labor between husband and wife. Firms
and families play a game similar to the Prisoners Dilemma, and the outcome is a
Pareto ine¢ cient gender wage gap situation.
There is also a large body of empirical literature which attempts to explain
the gender wage gap. Explanations include the so-called family gap: women who
marry and have children experience a higher wage gap than unmarried women with
no children (Ginther 2004; Waldfogel 1998; Winder 2004), job segmentation, i.e.,
men and women are allocated di¤erently to occupations that di¤er in the wages
they pay (Meyersson Milgrom et al. 2001), and self-selection of women into sectors
that have experienced a relatively lower wage growth (Rosholm and Smith 1996).
Other explanations suggest that family-friendly policies may have adverse e¤ects on
female wages (Gupta et al. 2006), or that evidence of a glass ceiling e¤ect6 prevents
women from being paid the same as men (Meyersson Milgrom and Petersen 2006).
Finally, Blackaby et al. (2005) suggest that discrimination causes women to be
underpaid. Still, however, a large fraction of the gender wage gap seems to remain
unaccounted for (Blau and Kahn forthcoming).
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we provide some data to
motivate our model. Section 3 develops a model in full generality by describing the
representative two-person family, the representative rm and the equilibrium. In
section 4, we solve our model and present the results. In section 5, we discuss the
welfare aspects of equilibria, and in section 6, we discuss policy implications. The
nal section provides some concluding remarks.
6The glass ceiling e¤ect refers to a situation within rms in which there is a rank or level
beyond which women are rarely promoted.
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2 Background
Female participation in the labor force has increased substantially during the last
half century in advanced economies. As an illustration, g. 1 shows how men and
womens labor force participation rates have evolved in the US since the 1950s.
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Figure 1: US labor force participation for men and women, 1950-98. (Data from
Fullerton 1999, table 1.)
The female labor force participation rates rose from 33.9 percent in 1950 to
59.8 percent in 1998. In the same period, the male labor force participation rates
declined from 86.4 percent to 74.9 percent. As a result, the di¤erence in labor
force participation rates went down from 52.5 percent in 1950 to 15 percent in 1998
(Fullerton 1999).
In addition, womens educational achievements are rising. In the US, women
have overtaken the role as the most educated sex since the mid-90s (Freeman 2004).
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Yet despite these advancements of womens position in the labor force, and despite
equal work equal payregulations in many countries,7 women do not seem to be
making the same salaries as men.
After women entered the labor force, the gender wage gap8 has been closing.
In the US, the gap converged in the 1980s after a stable period in the 1960s and
1970s (Blau and Kahn 2000). Since then the convergence has slowed. Fig. 2 shows
how the gender wage gap has evolved. The slope in the rst part of the period is
signicantly9 di¤erent from the slope of the second period.
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Figure 2: The US gender wage gap, 1979-2004. (Data from U.S. Department of
Labor 2005, table 16.)
7ILOs Equal Remuneration Convention no. C100 has, since its enactment in 1951, been ratied
by 162 countries, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp2.htm.
8In general, the gender wage gap is a rough estimate that includes both di¤erences in earnings
across male and female occupations as well as di¤erences in male and female earnings within
the same occupation. One should therefore be careful when comparing wage gap estimates.
9The null hypothesis of a common slope is rejected at the 1 percent level by use of a f-test.
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Indeed, Blau and Kahn (forthcoming) nd that in the US, the gender wage gap
has remained almost constant since the early 1990s. Similar ndings are presented
for other advanced economies, such as those of Sweden (Edin and Richardson 2002)
and Denmark (Gupta et al. 2006). In the OECD countries, on average, women
earn 84 percent of male hourly earnings (OECD 2002). There is some evidence,
however, that each new cohort of women is faring better than previous ones (Blau
and Kahn 2000).
The aim of this paper is to develop a theory that may explain this persistency of
the gender wage gap. We base our theory on another empirical regularity; namely,
that todays division of labor between spouses within the household looks surpris-
ingly traditional. Numerous time-use studies show that wives spend relatively more
time in home production than husbands, and that husbands spend relatively more
time in the workplace than wives. Table 1 shows the results from di¤erent surveys of
which most are sampled in the early 1990s.10 It presents hours spent on household
work and labor market work on a working weekday.
Table 1 Allocation of Daily Work Hours between the Home and the Workplace
Market Home Total
Women Men Women Men Women Men
Canada 8.5 9.6 2.8 1.7 11.3 11.3
Netherlands 4.1 6.7 4.0 2.0 8.1 8.7
Norway 7.2 8.7 3.4 2.1 10.6 10.8
UK 6.9 8.8 3.3 1.3 10.2 10.1
US 8.4 9.3 2.5 1.5 10.9 10.8
Italy 6.5 7.9 4.0 0.9 10.5 8.8
Austria 7.9 9.8 3.7 1.3 11.6 11.1
Source: Data from Freeman and Schettkat 2005, table 7.
10Freeman and Schettkat (2005) contains a full specication of the sampling years.
9
The table shows that for a range of developed economies, women do relatively
less market work and men do relatively less work in the home. Yet in total (with the
exception of Italy), men and women roughly spend the same amount of time on the
two activities. Short (2000) reports that the recent situation in UK is similar to the
pattern in table 1. In 1999, British men still use less time in household production
than do British women, and British men still use more time on paid work than do
British women. Bonke et al. (2005) nd similar results in Danish data.
This pattern in labor allocation is in accordance with the fact that women occupy
68 percent of all part-time jobs. About half of those women are married, whereas
the share of part-time workers, who are married men, is as low as 9 percent (U.S.
Department of Labor 2005, table 4).
In summary, it seems that despite the fact that women and men roughly share
same initial educational levels and opportunities, ex post, their labor patterns di-
verge. In particular, this divergence manifests itself as unequal labor allocation
between the home and the labor market, and as gender-di¤erences in wages. We
proceed to suggest how this pattern can be rationalized.
3 The Model
The economy consists of two sectors, a formal sector and a home sector. Each
sector is constituted by a number of identical rms and families. The home sector
produces household services and the formal sector produces a market commodity.
The constant N denotes the number of families. Families consist of a husband
and a wife, who are identied by an index i 2 f1; 2g. Family members are ex ante
identical except for gender. They supply labor to the rm, li; and to the family, ti;
10
and have constant labor endowments, T : We think of the labor endowment as the
daily number of hours used for work activities (cf. table 1); thus,
li + ti = T ;
11
and henceforth, li and ti are in the following expressed in number of hours as a
share of total daily labor endowment. Family members do not derive utility from
leisure and personal time.
3.1 Families
The representative family consumes the market commodity, x; and household ser-
vices, z; which we think of as including activities such as food preparation, dish
washing, household up-keeping, care for clothes, child care, shopping, do-it-yourself
work, gardening, etc. The market commodity is purchased from the market. The
household service, on the other hand, is produced and consumed entirely within the
home.12
We assume strict essentiality and complementarity in home production in the
sense that one family member cannot produce without labor input from her spouse.
Specically, home production is given as
z = (t1t2)

2 ; (1)
where, if z > 0; then t1 > 0 and t2 > 0: Moreover, 0 <   1. We assume there are
constant or decreasing returns to male and female labor input taken together. The
literature shows no strong prior on this point, but the constant returns formulation
11We shall refer to any combination (ti; li) = (ti; T   ti) as the family members labor (or time)
allocation between the home sector and the rm sector.
12One could argue that household services are to a certain extent available on a formal market.
Time-use studies, however, show that families produce (at least part of) the service themselves
(Bonke et al. 2005; Freeman and Schekatt 2005; Short 2000).
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is often used for its convenience in empirical analysis (Apps and Rees 1997; Aronsson
et al. 2001). Note that the factor shares of female and male labor input are taken
to be identical. This reects the idea that husband and wife are equally productive
if they allocate their labor equally.
Each family member has identical preferences and an equal weight in the family
welfare function in conformity with a conventional unitary household model13 with
household production. The family utility function, u; is for convenience taken to
be linearly additive:
u(x; z) = ax+ bz; (2)
where a > 0 and b > 0 are parameters. For given hourly wage rates, w1 and w2;
the family maximizes its utility
max
t1;t2
u(x; z) (3)
subject to its budget, production, and labor constraints:
pxx = w1l1 + w2l2; (4)
z = (t1t2)

2 ; (5)
li + ti = T ; i 2 f1; 2g ; (6)
li  0; ti  0; (7)
by e¢ ciently allocating labor to home production and to earning market wages.
The price, px, of the market commodity is our numeraire.
The household service is not traded, and therefore it has no market price. How-
ever, a price for the household service, pz, can be dened as a shadow price at an
13This aspect of our model could be made more general by using a collective household model
(Chiappori 1988) which allows household members to have di¤erent preferences and to have dif-
ferent weights in the family welfare function.
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optimum. Using the wage rate as the shadow price of labor input to home pro-
duction, we can, as intra-household e¢ ciency in the family consumption allocation
requires that the marginal rate of substitution between the two goods equals their
price ratio, @u=@x
@u=@z
= px
pz
; derive pz as the ratio ba .
In a solution where li > 0 and ti > 0; an e¢ cient allocation of labor endowments
is reached when the marginal value product of labor in home production equals its
opportunity cost (the hourly wage rate). Specically, the rst order conditions to
the family utility maximization problem in such a solution can be expressed as
b
a
@(t1t2)

2
@t1
= w1; (8)
b
a
@(t1t2)

2
@t2
= w2; (9)
and dividing (8) by (9), we obtain an expression for the gender wage ratio (or gap):
w1
w2
=
t2
t1
: (10)
By (10), the wage ratio equals the inverse ratio of labor input into household pro-
duction; if a family member earns relatively higher wage rates than her spouse, she
allocates relatively less time in home production than her spouse, and vice versa.14
If family members earn the same wage rate, they allocate labor in the same way.
The rst order conditions, (8) and (9), are in general not satised in case of
boundary solutions, i.e., when li = 0 or ti = 0. Such situations occur if the marginal
cost of the household service is di¤erent from its price for any allocation of labor,
namely, if wi=
@(t1t2)=2
@ti
6= pz.
14This prediction is tested by Albanesi and Olivetti (2006) on American data. They nd a
signicant negative correlation between the husband-wife ratio of earnings and their home hours
ratio.
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3.2 Firms
The representative rm operates in a competitive market and produces the market
commodity taking labor as input. It decides how many male and female workers,
N1 and N2, to employ taking the hours of labor supplied by each worker and the
hourly wage rates as given.
Each worker produces an output, and, thus, labor inputs from each gender are
perfect substitutes. Let e denote e¤ectiveness of each unit of labor input at the
rm. We assume that e¤ectiveness is not gender-specic, but only a function of
labor allocation. In particular, we assume that due to indivisibility, e¤ectiveness is
(linearly) increasing in hours per day in employment:
e = e(li) = li; (11)
so @e(li)
@li
> 0:
Total rm output per day, q; is the sum of output produced by each employee
per day given as
q = A [e(l1)l1N1 + e(l2)l2N2] ; (12)
where A is a positive productivity term, and @q
@Ni
= Ae(li)li is the marginal produc-
tivity of a worker i; which depends on the number of hours the worker puts into
production. As li is taken as given, from the standpoint of the rm, the rm has
constant returns to scale in employment. An implication of (11) in (12) is that
longer hours worked at the rm lead to higher marginal productivity of labor as
well as of workers.
The rm decides how many workers to recruit in order to maximize its prots, ;
which are the rms revenues minus its costs. As the price of the market commodity
14
is the numeraire, the prot maximization problem is to
max
N1;N2
 = fA [e(l1)l1N1 + e(l2)l2N2]  w1l1N1   w2l2N2g : (13)
Taking w1; w2; l1; and l2 as given, in a competitive market, the rm employs workers
until their marginal daily productivity, Ae(li)li; equalizes their marginal daily costs,
wili. Hence,
@
@N1
= Ae(l1)l1   w1l1 = 0, Ae(l1)  w1 = 0; (14)
@
@N2
= Ae(l2)l2   w2l2 = 0, Ae(l2)  w2 = 0: (15)
Since labor, l1 and l2; is measured in hours, the solution to the rms problem
depends on the relationship between hourly wages and e¤ectiveness of an hour of
labor at the rm adjusted by the productivity term A. In the following, we refer
to Ae(li) as the average productivity of labor per hour, i = f1; 2g. We have three
di¤erent situations describing the rms employment demand:
Ni =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if Ae(li) > wi;
[0;1[ if Ae(li) = wi;
0 if Ae(li) < wi:
(16)
If Ae(li) > wi the rm would want to hire an innite amount of type i workers, if
Ae(li) < wi the rm would not want to hire any type i workers, and if Ae(li) = wi
the rm is indi¤erent about the number of type i workers.
3.3 Equilibrium
The conditions for existence of a competitive15 equilibrium in the economy involve:
(i) the labor market, (ii) the market commodity, and (iii) the household service.
15The economy is competitive although there is an inherent externality: the spillover e¤ect from
household service production to labor market productivity which the family does not internalize.
15
There are two types of equilibria. An interior equilibrium, in which the produc-
tion levels of both x and z are strictly positive,16 and a specialized equilibrium, in
which only one sector is producing.
An interior equilibrium involves a positive price vector, (w1; w2); at which mar-
kets for male and female labor, as well as the market commodity, and the household
service, clear; and for which the marginal conditions for an optimum given by the
rms and the familys rst order conditions are satised.
There is a market clearing condition for each of the two goods. For every family,
maximization of utility ((3)-(7)) yields a labor allocation which satises
pzz =
b
a
(t1t2)

2 ; (17)
so that household services consumed equal household services produced. Also the
market commodity production must equal the market commodity demand. As the
rms production technology is linear homogenous in employment, we can normalize
the number of rms to unity. In this case,
q = Nx (18)
holds, where
q = A [e(l1)l1N1 + e(l2)l2N2] and Nx = N(w1l1 + w2l2): (19)
Finally, the employment clearing conditions are as follows. If there is a solution
with a nite market commodity production, then from (16) we have that
Ae(li) = wi (20)
16Due to complementarity of male and female labor input in home production it follows that
when home production is operative then t1 > 0 and t2 > 0. Moreover, as we prove in proposition
2 below, an equilibrium where only one spouse spends all time in home production does not exist.
If instead, the household service is produced separately by each adult, at least one individual will
completely specialize labor resources in this sector. This result resembles Theorem 2.3 in Becker
(1991, 34).
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holds.17 Hence, (20) is a necessary condition for an interior competitive equilibrium.
Together with the constant returns assumption on Ni (not on li), (20) implies that
the competitive rm is indi¤erent about the number of workers it employs. In
equilibrium, the number of female and male workers, N1 and N2; equals the number
of families N ; i.e., N1 = N2 = N:
Substituting (11) in (20) gives the following employment clearing conditions
Al1 = w1; (21)
and
Al2 = w2: (22)
Productivity of an hour of labor equals the hourly wage. In the interior equilibrium,
female and male labor supply equals female and male labor demand when (8) equals
(21), and (9) equals (22). Using li = T   ti we can derive two equations in t1 and
t2 :
A(T   t1) = b
a

2
t
 2
2
1 t

2
2 ; (23)
A(T   t2) = b
a

2
t

2
1 t
 2
2
2 : (24)
Eq. (23) and (24) states that in equilibrium, average productivity of one hour of
labor in the workplace has to equal the marginal value product of labor in home
production.
We can now characterize an interior equilibrium as any combination of t1 and t2
which solves (23) and (24). Such a combination clears markets for male and female
labor, and supports a price vector, (w1; w2); for which also the market for x clears,
and rms earn zero prots.
17If Ae(li) < wi holds, production of the consumption good is zero, and if Ae(li) > wi holds,
the rm earns positive prots.
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4 Results
In solving the model, it this useful to dene a labor allocation for which t1 = t2
as symmetric, and one for which t1 6= t2 as asymmetric. Both cases can occur,
but by (21) and (22), only an asymmetric situation leads to a gender wage gap.
Specically, we have
Proposition 1 (Symmetric equilibrium.) If 0 <  < 1 and b
a

2A
<

T
2 
2 
(1 )1 ; then there exist two interior symmetric equilibria. If  = 1
and b
a
1
2A
< T; then there exists one interior symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
When t1 = t2  t; equations (23) and (24) collapse into
A(T   t) = b
a

2
t 1: (25)
In equilibrium, the average productivity of an hour of labor in the rm equals the
marginal value product of labor in home production as illustrated in g. 3.
The dashed line in g. 3 illustrates the hourly wage rate as a function of la-
bor used in home production (i.e. t) which satises the zero prot condition in
(16). Due to the negative spillover from household production to productivity at
the rm, the hourly wage decreases. The solid lines illustrate the marginal value
product of labor in home production. The horizontal line illustrates the case where
 = 1. The curved lines represent examples for 0 <  < 1: The innermost curve
illustrates b
a

2A
<

T
2 
2 
(1   )1  and the two intersections with the dashed
line illustrate the two equilibria. The uttermost curve illustrates a situation where
b
a

2A
>

T
2 
2 
(1   )1 ; which is an economy without an interior symmetric
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equilibrium, as the marginal value product of labor in home production exceeds the
hourly wage rate for all allocations of labor resources. In this situation, only the
home sector is operative.
10.50
1
0.5
0
Share of Labor Used at Home: t
M VP/Hourly W age Rate
Figure 3: An illustration of symmetric equilibria. Symmetric equilibria exist in
points where the hourly wage (illustrated by the dashed line) equals the
marginal value product of labor in home production (illustrated by the
solid line). Spouses are in the same intersection point.
Assume the hourly wage is such that it corresponds to one of the intersection
points between the dashed and the solid line in g. 3. In this case, the rms are
willing to hire the workers, since marginal productivity just equals the marginal
costs. Moreover, workers do not want to supply neither more nor less labor to the
rm. If they supply more (i.e., decrease their labor input into home production),
the marginal value product of labor in home production exceeds the given hourly
wage rate. If they supply less (i.e., increase their labor input into home production),
the marginal value product of labor in home production is less than the given hourly
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wage rate.
The intuition behind the existence of two symmetric equilibria can be explained
as follows. When the household production function is concave in total labor input
(0 <  < 1), for small ts, the marginal value product of labor in home production
is high and larger than the corresponding average productivity of an hour of labor
in the rm, or equivalently, the hourly wage. As t increases, marginal productivity
of labor in home production decreases to a point where it is exceeded by the hourly
wage rate. As t becomes even larger, however, the negative spillover from home
production onto average productivity at the rm increases further. Eventually, the
spillover damages productivity to an extent that marginal value product of labor in
home production again exceeds the hourly wage rate.
Likewise, in the situation where  = 1; if the hourly wage rate coincides with the
marginal value product of labor used in home production, the family is indi¤erent
as to how much labor they supply to the rm. The rm, however, is only willing to
hire labor when labor productivity is equal to, or higher than, the wage they must
pay. To the left of the intersection point in g. 3, however, rms would demand an
innite number of workers; therefore this cannot be an equilibrium. On the other
hand, when b
a
1
2A
> T; the marginal value product of labor in home production
exceeds the hourly wage for all allocations of labor resources, and all labor is used
in the home.
Similarly, we analyze the asymmetric equilibrium:
Proposition 2 (Asymmetric equilibrium.) If b
a

2A
<

T
2
2 
; then there exist
two interior asymmetric equilibria.
Proof. See Appendix.
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The asymmetric solution is illustrated by g. 4. In g. 4, again the dashed line
illustrates decreasing hourly wages as a function of labor used in home production.
The uttermost curve illustrates the situation where b
a

2A
>

T
2
2 
; the situation
without an interior solution. The innermost curve intersects the dashed line twice,
and illustrates the situation where husband and wife, despite being completely
identical ex ante, allocate their labor endowments di¤erently between the home
and the workplace.
10.50
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Figure 4: Asymmetric equilibria. Asymmetric equilibria are given by the pair of
points where the hourly wage rate (illustrated by the dashed line) equals
the marginal value product of labor in home production (illustrated by
the solid line). Household members are in separate intersection points.
Whereas in the symmetric equilibrium, each spouse allocates the same labor
to home production, and therefore an equilibrium is a situation where household
members are located in the same intersection point of the two curves in g.
3, the asymmetric equilibrium is an equilibrium, in which one family member is
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locatedin one intersection point and, simultaneously, the spouse is locatedin
the other intersection point. In general, we have two possible pairings of gender and
location.Household members may allocate labor according to traditional gender
roles, or inversely.
Proposition 3 (Multiple interior equilibria.) If an interior asymmetric equi-
librium is supported by a positive price vector (w1; w2), there exists another price
vector ( ew1; ew2) 6= (w1; w2) which supports an interior symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
By proposition 3, we establish that for some sub-interval of the parameters A;
a; and b; the model has multiple interior equilibria which results in either gender-
similarities or gender-di¤erences in labor allocation.
This result is important. It mirrors a self-fullling nature of expectations about
gender roles. The familys e¢ cient response to traditional beliefs about earnings is
to actually allocate labor as stereotypical workers. On the other hand, the familys
e¢ cient response to unisex beliefs is to allocate labor identically.
Proposition 3 suggests that the persistency in the gender wage gap relates to
persistency in the perception of the patterns of sexual roles. We explore this issue
further in detail in section 5, but rst we notice that the model has interesting
comparative statics for the asymmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 4. Assume the economy is in an asymmetric equilibrium. A
higher productivity level A is associated with a larger gender wage gap.
Proof. See Appendix.
For a given initial asymmetric labor allocation, we consider a situation where A
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increases and, consequently, labor productivity in the rm goes up. The person with
the lower t (the most labor allocated to the rm) experiences the highest increase
in hourly wage as average productivity of an hour of labor increases in A at the
rate (T   t).
As is clear from (10), the familys e¢ cient labor allocation response to such a
change in the relative hourly wage rates is that the person, who works most at the
rm, allocates more labor to the rm, and the person, who works most at the home,
allocates more labor to the home. Hence, the person who works most in the home
ends up earning a lower wage than in the original equilibrium. In this way, increases
in A magnify any existing di¤erences productivity, and the model predicts higher
wage di¤erentials for higher paid formal sectors.
Proposition 4 can be taken to the evidence. It predicts that the gender wage
gap is larger within families that work in sectors with higher wage rates. Fig. 5 is
a scatter plot of female/male earnings ratio against male earnings.
Each dot represents an occupation like civil engineers, lawyers, photographers,
etc. If couples predominantly exist within similar occupations,18 g. 5 conrms
proposition 4. Indeed, the corresponding regression19 reveals a statistically signif-
icant negative relationship between male median weekly earnings and the gender
wage gap.
18Some empirical evidence for educational homogamy, i.e., individuals marry individuals with
similar characteristics such as occupation, education, and religion, is presented in Blossfeld and
Timm (2003).
19The intercept estimate is 92.99 (38.66) and the slope estimate is -0.02 (-5.26), where the
numbers in the parenthesis are the t-statistics. The fraction of the variation in the wage gap
explained by the regression is above 20 percent (R2 is 0.21).
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Figure 5: An illustration of the gender wage gap across occupations in the US.
The gure shows that higher male earnings within an occupation are
correlated with a larger gender wage gap, i.e., lower womens earnings
relative to those of mens. (Data from U.S. Department of Labor 2005,
table 2.)
Proposition 5. Assume the economy is in an asymmetric equilibrium. A
higher  reduces the gender wage gap if b
Aa
> 2

exp

 2


.
Proof. See Appendix.
First, we analyze the situation where b
Aa
> 2

exp

 2


is satised. In this case,
increases in  increase the marginal value product of labor in home production
for both household members at given labor allocations. The increase is largest,
however, for the person, who works less in the home. Therefore, there is room for
redistributionof the marginal value product. The benet of letting the outside
workingwork more in home production more than compensates for the loss of home
production that the home workingperson sacrices to enable the reallocation of
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labor.
Due to changes in the spillover e¤ect from this reallocation of labor, also the
equilibrium wage rates are a¤ected. Since, in response to a high ; the outside
workingperson works less out, and home workingperson works less at home,
the di¤erences in productivities at the rm diminish, and in an equilibrium, wage
rates are more equal.
The explanation for the opposite case, the situation where b
Aa
< 2

exp

 2


;
follows the same logic. However, in this situation the marginal value product
declines instead of increases in response to increased . As it declines most for
the outside workingperson, it pays for the family to let this person work even
less in the home, at the expense of letting the home workingperson work more
at home. This leads to a higher wage gap.
When the weight on the household service in the utility function, b; is low relative
to the weight on the market commodity, a; the wage gap is more likely to increase
in response to higher . In this case, the initial labor allocation across spouses is
already relatively specialized in an asymmetric equilibrium. In the limit, when t of
one spouse approaches zero, increases in  diminish the marginal value product of
labor in home production.
5 Welfare Analysis by Numerical Examples
The public debate about gender roles often favors equality on the labor markets
and in the home (Hakim 2004), but less often are the welfare properties of the
gender wage gap discussed. According to Becker (1985), welfare increases with
specialization, whereas in Chichilnisky (2005), in a society with high skill levels,
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equal labor division across family members generates the highest welfare.
This section provides some numerical examples, which are reported in table 2
and table 3, to illustrate the welfare properties of the current model. Table 2 shows
simulated symmetric equilibria, and table 3 shows simulated asymmetric equilibria.
Table 2 Simulated Symmetric Equilibria (T = 10)
ta x z u(x; z)
b
Aa
 tl : th lb : hc l : h l : h
10 0.3 0.07 9.69 197.21 0.19 0.45 1.98 201.71 19.96
10 0.6 0.05 8.74 198.01 3.18 0.17 3.67 199.66 39.90
10 0.9 0.00 6.25 200.00 28.13 0.00 5.20 200.00 80.16
15 0.3 0.12 9.54 195.23 0.42 0.53 1.97 203.17 29.93
15 0.6 0.14 8.05 194.44 7.61 0.31 3.50 199.05 60.03
15 0.9 0.02 4.15 199.20 68.45 0.03 3.60 299.65 122.44
20 0.3 0.18 9.37 192.86 0.79 0.60 1.96 204.82 39.93
20 0.6 0.30 7.26 188.18 15.02 0.49 3.29 197.89 80.72
20 0.9 0.90 1.00 165.62 162.00 0.91 1.00 183.81 182.00
13 0.9 0.01 5.02 199.60 49.60 0.02 4.27 199.81 105.14
a Across the symmetric equilibria, tl and th are the lowand highequilibrium values, (tl
< th), of labor spent in home production.
b The label lindicates values which corresponds to tl.
c The label hindicates values which corresponds to th.
Let overall welfare in society, W; be given by the sum of household utilities and
rm prots
W = Nu(x; z) +  = Nu(x; z); (26)
where the last equality follows from rms earning zero prots in equilibrium.
The family consumes di¤erent ratios of the household service and the market
commodity across equilibria. In table 2, we notice that utility is highest for the equi-
librium in which spouses allocate most labor to the workplace, i.e., in t = tl. This
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is due to the negative spillover e¤ect of home production onto labor productivity at
the rm. The extra production of the market commodity more than compensates
for the decline in home production.
In table 3, we report the equilibrium in which women spend most time in the
household.20 Hence, the gender wage gap, ; is the wife-husband wage ratio.
Table 3 Simulated Asymmetric Equilibria (T = 10)
b
Aa
 ta1 : t2 x z u(x; z) 
10 0.3 9.84 : 0.16 96.85 1.07 107.56 0.00
10 0.6 9.49 : 0.51 90.32 1.60 106.37 0.00
10 0.9 8.10 : 1.90 69.22 3.42 103.43 0.06
15 0.3 9.73 : 0.27 94.75 1.16 112.08 0.00
15 0.6 9.05 : 0.95 82.81 1.91 111.41 0.01
15 0.9 - : - - - - -
20 0.3 9.62 : 0.38 92.69 1.21 116.98 0.00
20 0.6 8.47 : 1.53 74.08 2.16 117.21 0.03
20 0.9 - : - - - - -
13 0.9 5.42 : 4.58 50.35 4.24 105.51 0.71
a In the asymmetric equilibrium, t1 and t2 denote the labor allocated to home production by
the woman and the man respectively.
In the asymmetric equilibrium, the gender-di¤erence in labor allocation is smaller
when  is high. This is what we expect, since by proposition 5, when b
Aa
>
2

exp

2 


is fullled (which is the case when b
Aa
2 (10; 20)), the wage gap is
increasing in . Table 3 also conrms proposition 4. A higher A increases the
gender wage gap, i.e., decrease the wife-husband wage ratio.
We compare the asymmetric equilibrium with the symmetric equilibrium which
yields the higher welfare. We notice that production of the market commodity is
higher everywhere in the symmetric equilibrium than in the asymmetric equilibrium,
20The results equally apply to the reversed situation in which men are spending most time in
the household.
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but production of the household service is higher in the asymmetric equilibrium
than in the symmetric equilibrium. Yet the extra production in the formal sector
makes up for the loss of household services and welfare is higher in the symmetric
equilibrium. The simulations thereby suggest that, for the model presented in the
current paper, a gender wage gap is Pareto inferior in that utility in the symmetric
equilibrium (with least labor used in home production) is higher everywhere than
utility in the asymmetric equilibrium.
The explanation for this result is that when the economy is in an interior asym-
metric equilibrium, the home production su¤ers a productivity loss as family mem-
bers are not allocating identical amounts of labor input. Since labor input of each
spouse has identical factor shares, and labor input is complementary in produc-
tion, clearly the cost minimizing labor allocation in household production is when
spouses allocate identical amounts of labor. Accordingly, in the symmetric equilib-
rium, total labor input in home production may be less and the asymmetric case
(which is always equal to T as t1 = T   t2 cf. the proof of proposition 2) and yet
produce more household service.
The last simulation in both tables o¤ers a parameterization which gives a gender
wage ratio that lies in the range of typical gender wage ratio estimates, cf. OECD
(2002).
6 Discussion
Albeit the model does not provide a priori insight as to the specic equilibrium
outcome among the possibilities of interior equilibria, a key prediction is that if
families believe that wages are stereotype, the economy will experience a gender
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wage gap with women earning less than men. In this sense, the gender wage gap is
explained as a self-fullling prophecy.
A natural way for todays families to decide on labor allocation would be to use
information on yesterdayswages. If, for what could be historical and cultural
reasons, women used to be less educated than men and to participate less in the
labor force, cf. g. 1, it would be rational that women historically (and yesterday)
earned less than men. In this way, even though the premises, which determined the
historical labor market outcome have changed, in that today, women and men share
the same starting point to become equally productive in both the home and in the
workplace, current beliefs about earnings may be historically biased in favor of
stereotype beliefs. Hence, one may argue that the persistence of the gender wage
gap in developed societies is possibly due to a self-fullling history biason beliefs.
The literature o¤ers explanations of why families appear not to choose a
symmetric labor allocation. Table 4 demonstrates how gender roles are viewed
within British families.
Table 4 Couples Aiming for Symmetric Roles
Dual-earnera Full-time Workersb
Men Women Men Women
Percentage choosing symmetric roles 44 41 44 56
Source: Hakim (2004).
aDual-earner couples refer to households in which either spouse reports being in employment.
bFull-time workers couples consist of full-time working husbands and wives.
The numbers suggest that the majority of couples aim for traditional roles.
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Hakim (2004) argues that one explanation is that women regard themselves as sec-
ondary earners, and that employment does not provide them with their central
identity.21 This would be in conformity with our analysis. An implication of our
model is that family reality and family beliefs about earnings have to change si-
multaneously for the economy to move from the stereotype asymmetric equilibrium
to a unisex symmetric equilibrium. Hence, e¤ective policies are policies that can
change norms of society. Without such policies the gender wage gap is likely to
persist as a rational reaction to stereotype family beliefs about gender roles, even
when there is no actual gender discrimination or other initial di¤erences between
the two sexes.
Of course, there may be many reasons as to why families do not change their
traditional beliefs. One explanation is that both men and women view equity as
a relevant concept in the workplace, but neither view the home as a workplace.
Roughly speaking, if housework is a womans labor of love,equity does not come
into question. Moreover, men and women may dene certain jobs as feminine and
others as masculine. A woman is less of a woman if she does not keep the house, and
the man is less of a man if he does. If men compare themselves to other men, and
women to other women, and since the majority of households have unequal division
of labor, both the woman or the man are likely to perceive traditional gender roles
as normal and desirable (Hakim 2003; Valian 1999).
21She also nds that families without children have a traditional division of labor.
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7 Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates how the persistence of the gender wage gap in an economy
where male and female workers are ex ante identical with respect to education,
ability, and skill levels can be explained.
We show that complementarity of spousal labor in home production, and indi-
visibility of labor input in the workplace may lead to multiplicity of equilibria in
which familiesbeliefs about the gender wage gap are self-fullling. This means that
if family members believe that women earn less than men, ex post, intra-household
labor allocation justies such beliefs. Therefore, womens history on the labor mar-
ket may have severe implications for the labor market outcome today, which are not
easily overcome. Yet the welfare analysis reveals potential welfare gains to closing
the gender wage gap.
Naturally, the approach to explaining the gender wage gap o¤ered by the present
model hopes just to o¤er a small piece of the gender wage gap puzzle. Besides the
large literature that concerns di¤erences in human capital accumulation, a literature
largely initiated by Becker (1985), others have suggested that di¤erences in wages
can be attributed to a theory of male-dominated institutions,or preference theory
suggesting that women prefer to prioritize household tasks (Hakim 2004). Gender
di¤erences in networking (Montgomery 1991), or statistical discrimination (Moro
and Norman 2003, 2004), may also lead to di¤erences in wage rates.
31
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
When t1 = t2  t; the equations (23) and (24) collapse into
(T   t)t1  = b
Aa

2
: (27)
(This is eq. (25) in the main text.)
In general, a solution to (27) exists when the right hand side, which is para-
metrically given, is smaller than, or equal to, the maximum value of the left hand
side.
When  < 1; the left hand side is an inversely U-shapedpolynomial with a
unique maximum that is positively skewed. The maximum is found by rst di¤eren-
tiating the left hand side wrt t, then setting this expression equal to zero, and nally
isolate for t : @(T t)t
1 
@t
= 0) t  T   2t+ (t  T ) = 0, T 1 
2 

= t: Substi-
tuting this expression back into (27) determines the maximum value of the left hand
side as of this equation a function of ; argmax
t
(T   t)t1  =

T
2 
2 
(1  )1 :
Hence, in an interior equilibrium b
Aa

2


T
2 
2 
(1   )1  must be satised.
When the equation holds with equality, there is exactly one solution, otherwise
there are two solutions.
When  = 1 the left hand side of (27) is linear and equal to (T   t): Hence, the
maximum is given when t = 0; so argmax
t
(T   t) = T : For an interior equilibrium
to exist, b
a
1
2A
< T: 
8.2 Proof of Proposition 2
An interior equilibrium is given when (23) and (24) are satised simultaneously.
Dividing (23) and (24) means T t1
T t2 =
t2
t1
must hold. Rewriting this expression yields
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Tt1   t21 = Tt2   t22 , T (t1   t2) = t21   t22 , T (t1   t2) = (t1 + t2)(t1   t2) )
t1 + t2 = T for t1 6= t2:
Substituting t1 = T   t2 back into either (23) or (24), rearrange and solve for t2
gives
(T   t2)t2 =

b
Aa

2
 2
2 
: (28)
Eq. (28) is a second-order polynomial. By inspection we nd that the shape of the
left hand side is a symmetric parabola for which argmax
t2
(T   t2)t2 =

T
2
2
. The
left hand side is a constant larger than zero. If b
Aa

2
>

T
2
2 
; then there is no
solution to (28), and if b
Aa

2
=

T
2
2 
; then there is one solution (t1 = t2 = T2 );
and if b
Aa

2
<

T
2
2 
; then there are exactly two solutions satisfying t1 6= t2. 
8.3 Proof of Proposition 3
By proposition 1, b
Aa

2


T
2 
2 
(1 )1  and b
Aa
1
2
< T are necessary conditions
for an interior symmetric equilibrium when 0 <  < 1 and when  = 1 respectively.
The interior symmetric equilibrium is supported by a positive price vector which
we denote ( ew1; ew2): By proposition 2, bAa 2 < T22  is a necessary condition for an
interior asymmetric equilibrium, which is supported by another price vector which
we denote (w1; w2).
We want to prove that when there exists an asymmetric equilibrium, then there
also exists a symmetric equilibrium, i.e., that
T
2
2 


T
2  
2 
(1  )1  8 0 <  < 1; (29)
and 
T
2

 T 8  = 1: (30)
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We prove each in turn. First, simplify (29) to get
1
2
2 


1
2  
2 
(1  )1 :
Let LHS   1
2
2 
and RHS 

1
2 
2 
(1  )1 :We examine LHS and RHS
for  ! 0 and  ! 1 respectively.
LHS
!0
=
1
4
and LHS
!1
=
1
2
;
RHS
!0
=
1
4
and RHS
!1
= 1:
Hence, in the limits RHS  LHS: In order to study monotonicity, we rst take
logs:
ln(LHS) = (2  ) ln

1
2

;
ln(RHS) = (1  ) ln (1  ) + (   2) ln(2  );
and then we take the derivative wrt :
@[ln(LHS)]
@
= ln (2) > 0;
@[ln(RHS)]
@
=   ln (1  ) + ln(2  ) > 0:
Hence, both sides of (29) are monotonically increasing. Furthermore,
@2[ln(LHS)]
@2
= 0;
@2[ln(RHS)]
@2
=
1
(1  ) (2  ) > 0:
We can thus conclude, that if an interior asymmetric equilibrium exists, then also
an interior symmetric equilibrium exists for 0 <  < 1:
Second, simplify (30) to get
1
2
 1;
which is true: 
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8.4 Proof of Proposition 4
From the proof of proposition 2 we have that an interior asymmetric equilibrium
must satisfy
(T   t2)t2 =

b
Aa

2
 2
2 
; (31)
where T   t2 = t1:
Di¤erentiate the right hand side wrt A to get
@
 
b
Aa

2
 2
2 
@A
=

b
a

2
 2
2 
(
2
   2)A
2
 2 1 < 0;
which means that an increase in A shifts down the right hand side of (31).
The left hand side of (31) is an inverted U-shapedparabola, and therefore the
distance between the values of (T   t2) and t2 which solves the system increases as
A increases.
The wage gap is given as a function of t2 and t1 by (10): w1w2 =
t2
t1
. The more t1
and t2 di¤ers, the higher the gender wage gap. 
8.5 Proof of Proposition 5
From the proof of proposition 2 we have that an interior asymmetric equilibrium
must satisfy
(T   t2)t2 =

b
Aa

2
 2
2 
(32)
where T   t2 = t1:
In order to analyze the e¤ect of a change in  we take logs on both sides of this
equation:
ln(T   t2) + ln(t2) = 2
2  

ln

b
2Aa

+ ln()

:
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The left hand side does not vary with : For the right hand side we nd that
@
n
2
2 

ln
 
b
2Aa

+ ln()
o
@
=
2
2  

1
2  

ln

b
2Aa

+ ln()

+
1


:
As 0 <   1; ln() is non-positive, and ln   b
2Aa

< 0 if b
2Aa
< 1; we can conclude
that
@f 22  [ln( b2Aa)+ln()]g
@
> 0 only if b
Aa
> 2

exp

 2


: Again, the left hand side
of (32) is an inverted U-shapedparabola, and therefore the distance between the
values of (T   t2) and t2 which solves the system increases as  increases when
b
Aa
> 2

exp

 2


.
The wage gap is given as a function of t2 and t1 by (10): w1w2 =
t2
t1
. The more t1
and t2 di¤ers, the higher the gender wage gap. 
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